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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O·F THE STAT'E OF UTAH

SOUTHEAST FURNITURE COMpANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
9175

-vs.GRANITE HOLDING COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF AP·P·ELLANT
STATEMENT 1Qf FACTS

The appellant, Granite Holding Company, was the
defendant below, and the respondent, Southeast Furniture Company, was the plaintiff.
This being an equity action for specific performance
on appellant's counterclaim, the appellate court may review the facts as well as the law.
For many years prior to 1941, the parties and others
used a right of way that extended south and west of

1
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the right of way referred to in this action. The present
right of way was created by joint action of the parties
and was substituted for the old right of way. The single
question to be decided is whether or not the appellant
is now entitled to continue to use the substituted right
of way.
The subject matter of this action is a right of way
which runs easterly from 1\{cClelland Street approximately 500 ft. south of 21st South Street in the Sugar
House area of Salt Lake City. This right of way amounts
to a continuation of Elm Avenue which runs westerly
directly opposite to it and on the west side of :\IcClelland
A venue. The right of way is approximately 33 feet wide
and 170 feet long. (Ex. D-3, D-9, R. 83, 133).
This roadway is used by appellant and respondent
and their customers and others to gain access to property owned by appellant and respondent and others in
the general areas east and north of this roadway. The
roadway has, in fact, been used by the public generally
for many years to gain access to the plaees of business,
shops, and stores in this area. (R. 94, 95, 96, 117).
The title to the land comprising the ''Test 130 feet
of this roadway is in the respondent and the title to the
land cmnprising the east 40 feet is in the appellant. (Ex.
D-2, D-3, D-4, D-9, R. 132).
Appellant clailns the right to the joint use of this
roadway beceause of ownership of part of the land nlaking up the roadway and by reason of an executed express
oral agreement, or by reason of an in1plied agree1nent
or by reason of estoppel, or as a public way.
2
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For many years prior to about 1941, appellant and
respondent and others gained access to the property in
this area by means of a long, hazardous, inconvenient,
roundabout and narrow right of way that entered east
off of McClelland Street approximately 250 ft. south
of the present roadway and curved northeast into their
property in this area. (R. 84-90, 104, 105, 107, 113). The
greatly increased business activity of the respondent,
Southeast Furniture Company, made it very desirable
for it to have a wider and more convenient means of
access to its store properties from 1\icClelland Street and
it repeatedy urged appellant to join with it in creating
this new joint right of way. (R. 89-90, 107-8). The closing
of the old right of way would also relieve respondent
from a possible encroachment claim by a land owner
who stood to gain by the closing of it. (R. 163-4).
Accordingly, in 1941 it was agreed by appellant
acting through Mr. Nephi J. Hanson, its President, now
deceased, and respondent acting through Mr. S. E.
Sorenson, its President, now also deceased, that the old
right of way would be abandoned (R. 120) and a new
joint right of way would be created by them to which .
both appellant and respondent would have a joint right
of use. (R. 85, 90-95, 98, 106, 107, 114, 117, 120-22, 133
135, 136, 137). In fact, counsel for respondent agrees
that if appellant had asked for a right of way deed at
the time of the foregoing agreement by which this right
of way was created, it would have been given. (R. 150)
In 1941 contemporaneously ·with the foregoing agreement, respondent acquired title to the land which became
the western part of the roadway, and appellant tore
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down rental garages on its land to open up and make
available land for the eastern part of the roadway. (R.
108-10, 113, 120-1, 136, Ex. P-6 and 7). Both parties
thus joined in the actual physical preparation and creation of the roadway (R. 108).
Upon the creation of the roadway, it was put into
joint use by appellant and respondent and others, and
thereafter, appellant, relying upon the agreement and
conduct of respondent, took action which irrevocably
closed its old right of way to the south, (R. 91, 117) and
thereby abandoned, quit-claimed away (R. 135, 136, Ex.
D-8) and extinguished its only other means of access
to its property from McClelland Avenue. This new roadway ever since such time has been and now is in coninuous use by appellant, respondent, and others (R. 107,
122, 166).
As evidence of the intent and agreement that this
should he a roadway open to the joint use of appellant
and respondent and others, appellant and respondent
in 1942 jointly requested in writing that the Salt Lake
City Commission dedicate this very roadway here under
consideration as a public street and as an eastern extension of Elm A venue. In pursuance of this, the parties
tendered executed deeds conveying their respective titles
to the City. (R. 94-9·6, 144, 145, Ex. D-2, D-3, D-4). The
City decided against dedication of the roadway inasmuch
as its east end ter1ninated on private property, and the
deeds were returned to the parties. (Ex. D-3, R. 98).
For more than ten years the road·wav was used
harmoniously by both parties and the public generally
4
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(R. 107, 117, 119, 147-8), and there was never a question
b~t what appellant and respondent had reciprocal rights
of way over each other's property and a joint right to
the use of the roadway pursuant to the earlier acts and
agreements of the parties. (R. 115, 121, 139) During
this time respondent posted no signs of any kind. (R.
94, 99, 101, 102) In the meantime, the officers of appellant and respondent who had entered into the agreement
and who had acted in creating the roadway, died.
Appellant's right to the use of the right of way was
not questioned until about 1952 when appellant sought
written evidence of it from respondent in order to satisfy
an insurance company that was making a loan to appellant on its land in this area. Respondent refused to
give appellant such written evidence unless appellant
would pay an exhorbitant price of $10,000.00. (R. 137,
138) Subsequently, intensely bitter feelings arose between appellant and respondent over this and other
matters apart from this roadway (R. 145), and in an
attempt to strike at appellant, the respondent filed a
complaint against appellant initiating this action on
l\1arch 30, 1954 (R. l) clai1ning rentals due respondent
for the use by appellant of that portion of the roadway
to which respondent had title.
Such action was filed without notice and without
prior claim to rent having been asserted in any way by
Respondent. (R. 92, 139-40) Further, the complaint
makes no allegation of any express agreement for the
payment of rent. Appellant claims that it was about
this time that the small sign shown in Exhibit P-5 was

5
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posted concerning the penmss1ve use of the roadway.
(R. 99, 102, 138, 146) The large sign that may have
been posted earlier by respondent, was only directional
to respondent's place of business. A. close examination
of the picture of the large sign shown in Exhibit P -5
clearly supports this. There can be seen showing through
the white painted arrow the old original words "Service
Entrance" even though an attempt has been made to
paint them out. Any reference to permissive use originated with the small square sign placed of recent years
about the time that respondent filed its complaint. (R.
99, 138, 140, 146) There is no definite evidence as to
when either sign was placed. However, it is clear no
signs of any kind were posted for several years. (R. 93,
99, 102, 138, 146) The appellant never considered that
such signs pertained to it because of the prior agreement
and acts of the parties (R. 140, 146), and the appellant
and the public g·enerally, have eontinuously used and
now use said roadway.
On May 5, 1954, one 1nonth after the filing of the
foregoing Complaint, appellant filed a motion to dismiss
and an answer to the cmnplaint. Nothing was done by
respondent to press its suit for alleged rentals for many
years. (R. 27, 29) Finally, the appellant, in order to
affirm its right to cross over that portion of the roadway
to which respondent elain1s title and to settle the cloud
on said right of way caused by the pending suit, filed an
amended answer and counterclaim on September 9, 1958,
requesting specific performance of the agreement of
the parties.
6
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It is significant that respondent thought so little
of the contentions of its complaint that it failed to appear on appellant's motion for leave to amend its answer
and to file its counterclaim. Further, respondent made
no effort to reply to the counterclaim which was duly
served on Septmnber 24, 1958, and the default of respondent was entered October 21, 1958. Appellant was
awarded a default judgment on its counterclaim more
than three months later on January 27, 1959. (R. 8, 16,
27, 29) This default judgment was set aside on March
9, 1959. Thereafter, respondent again did nothing to
press the complaint and alleged claim for rent, and
appellant advanced the case to trial by filing a notice
of readiness for trjal on May 20, 1959.
The case was set for trial on October 8, 1959, and
at the commenceinent of the trial, respondent abandoned
its alleged rental claim and voluntarily requested dismissal of its complaint. (R. 76) It developed in the
course of the trial on appellant's counterclaim, that the
evidence showed not only an executed oral agreement
creating a reciprocal right of way over the adjoining
land of the parties, but also a right of way by estoppel
and that the conduct, history and use of the right of
way amounted to the creation of a public highway
through public use in accordance with 27-1-2 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, and an amended answer and counterclaim to conform to this evidence was filed with leave
of the Court. (R. 48, 53, 62)
The appellant does not dispute the right of respondent to use appellant's portion of the right of way, but
seeks an affirmation of its right to the use of respond7
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ent' s portion of the right of way. In this regard, counsel
for respondent stated frankly that respondent "is not
asking that (appellant) be denied the right to the use
of the right of way." (R. 92-3) Further evidence of this
was the voluntary dismissal by respondent of its complaint. (R. 76, 92)
There is some evidence in the record that in recent
years, appellant has moved to acquire an interest in a
fifteen foot strip of land north of the present right of
way. (R. 128, 151-2) This was done in desperation and
as a possible escape in the event that the respondent
should prevail in its recent change of position in regard
to this right of way and to insure appellant's ability
to perform its prior and long standing obligations to
others to provide them a right of way. (R. 128-30) Respondent objected to any attempt to so explain tlris
acquisition in the course of the trial. (R. 152-3)
It would irreparably damage appellant to lose its
right in the substituted right of way.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
I.

There is an executed oral agreement creating a ioint and
reciprocal right of way over the adjoining lands of the
parties.

II.

The executed oral agreement takes it out of the statute of
frauds.

m·

The respondent is estopped to assert the statute of frauds.

IV.

A right of way over respondent's land has been created by
estoppel.

8
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V.

There is an implied agreement creating a ioint and reciprcal right of way over the adioining lands of the parties.

VI.

The roadway has been dedicated and abandoned to the
use of the public in accordance with 27-1-2 U.C.A. 1953.

VII.

There were no signs placed which prevented the creation of
ioint and reciprocal right of way by any of the means referred to by appellant.

VIII.

It was error to set aside respondent's default iudgment on
the counterclaim.

IX.

The failure of the trial court to rule upon the incompetency
of witnesses to testify on particular matters was preiudicial
error.

X.

The findings of the court are not responsive to and do not
cover all of the material issues.

XI.

The findings and iudgment are contrary to the evidence.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.
There is an Executed Oral Agreement Creating a
Joint and Reciprocal Right of Way Over the Adioining
Lands of the Parties.

It is not disputed that for some years prior to 1941
the parties with others used a right-of-way located several hundred feet south of the roadway now in question
in order to gain access to their properties from MeClelland Street. The appellant had reserved this rightof-way out of land it formerly held. It was a narrow,
inconvenient, roundabout right-of-way. Both parties had
9
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a valuable vested interest in it as it was the only existing
way they had to gain access to their properties from
McClelland Street since their properties did not abut
on McClelland Street.
Further, it is not disputed that by the acts of the
parties, a new, wide, direct, and much more convenient
roadway was created to the north of the old right-of-way
about 1941 which has been used continuously ever since
by the parties and others as the only means available
for them to gain access to their properties from McClelland Street. The appellant provided the necessary
land for the east portion of the roadway, and respondent
provided the necessary land for the west portion.
It is the contention of appellant that this new rightof-way was created pursuant to an express oral agreement which provided that appellant would have the right
to the use of such right-of-way. The court below ruled
that there was no such agreement. A review of the record
indicates there is an1ple evidence to show such an agreement.
Witness Clyde F. Hansen testified that he was personally present and participated in the negotiations
between appellant and respondent in which the oral
agreement was n1ade concerning the right of appellant
to use the new right-of-way. (R. 90, 91, 98, 107). At
that time this witness was secretary-treasurer of appellant.
Witness Willard B. Richards fron1 personal knowledge testified concerning an agremnent for the creation
and right of use of the right-of-way. His testnnony was
that he personally talked to officers of the appellant
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and respondent at the time and on the scene where the
roadway was being created by the demolition of buildings and the acquisition of new land, and he was told
they were by agreement going to change the right-ofway from the one going south. (R. 117, 120, 121, 122).
Witness W. L. Hansen testified concerning the oral
agreement by which the new joint right-of-way was created and by reason of which the appellant had a right
to the use of the right of way over the land of the respondent. The evidence also shows that the existence of
this oral agreement and resulting right was affirmed
by action of appropriate officers of respondent on several occasions (R. 133, 135, 136, 137, 146, 147, 149, 150).
It is significant that at no place in the entire record
is there any testimony for the respondent actually denying the existence of the oral agreement claimed by appellant. On the other hand, the circumstances and the
acts of the parties all go to corroborate the evidence
adduced by appellant that there is an executed oral
agreement as claimed by appellant.
The fact of the change of location of the right of
way evidences the required meeting of the minds for
the existence of the contract. The right-of-way could
not have been changed except upon mutual accord and
agreement. There is ample consideration to support the
contract in that appellant abandoned and gave up a
valuable right-of-way to the south and demolished income producing buildings and thereby forfeited and
permanently lost the monthly rental therefrom, and respondent gained a much more convenient and advantageous right-of-way.
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POINT II.
The Executed Oral Agreement Takes it out of the
Statute of Frauds.

There is no question but what the parties have fully
performed pursuant to their oral agreement for the
creation and use of the new right of way. The appellant
performed by tearing down its rental buildings to provide part of the necessary land for the right of way,
abandoning its old right of way to which it cannot now
be restored, and assisting in the actual physical preparation and creation of the new right of way. The loss
in rentals to appellant on the storage sheds since they
were torn down approximately 19 years ago conservatively a1nounts to at least $7,000.00. Respondent performed by acquiring and providing part of the necessary
land for the right of way, abandoning the use of the
old right of way, and assisting in the actual physical
preparation and creation of the new right of way. Further, ever since the creation of the new roadway, the
parties have jointly and continuously used and are now
using the new right of way. The only thing that remains
undone is the execution of cross deeds by the parties,
and counsel for the respondent admits that this would
have been done at the time had the appellant requested
it. (R. 150)
The appellant seeks judicial affirmation of its permanent right to use the right of way and a decree for
continued specific perforn1ance of the oral contract on
the part of respondent. The appellant cannot be restored to its former condition and right of way nor
would damages adequately compensate it for its loss
of this interest in land.
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It is a fundamental rule that executed or partially
performed oral agreements are taken out of the Statute
of Frauds and are enforceable. It is expressly provided
by 25-5-8 U.C.A. 1953 that:
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall be
construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in
case of part performance."
The rule that part performance of an oral agreement
takes it out of the Statue of Frauds specifically applies
to agreements relating to the creation of an easement.
The following rule is stated in at 49 Am. Jur. 790, Section 488:
"The doctrine of part performance applies to
a parol agreement for a permanent easement as
well as to an agreement for the sale of land. Thus,
an oral agreement for a private way or railroad
right of way, for the establishment of a private
road, street, or alley, or for a right of storage
is enforceable in equity where the grantee has
acted in reliance on the agreement so that the
failure to enforce the agreement specifically will
result in the perpetration of a fraud upon or injustice toward him."
The following are specific applications of the general rule and are contained at 101 A.L.R. 982, Part Performance of Oral Land Contracts:
"An oral agreement for the establishment of
a private road will be specifically enforced, where
it has been partly performed by the parties.''
"So, an oral agreement among several landowners that each will donate a strip of ground
necessary to lay out a continuous street and highway will be specifically enforced against one
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landowner at the suit of the others, where the
latter have performed." (Brower v. Walker, 182
Iowa 804, 166 N .W. 269)
The acts of part performance may of themselves
be such as to prove the contract and take it out of the
statute of frauds. If the acts performed are such that
they cannot be explained consistently with any other
agreement than the one alleged, they may be relied upon
as the sole proof of the contract.
"The true rule is, however, as we think, very
clearly stated by Pomeroy (Spec. Perf. Sec. 107)
in these words : 'The acts of part performance
must be such as show that some contract exists
between the parties, that they were done in pursuance thereof, and that it is not inconsistent
with the one alleged in the pleadings. Whenever
acts of part performance are made out which thus
point to a contract, the door is opened, 3;lld the
plaintiff may introduce additional parol evidence
directed immediately to the terms of the contract
relied upon'; a proposition which the author supports by abundant citation of authorities."
"If the acts of part performance prove the
whole contract, there is no occasion for any parol
evidence of is terms, and no difficulty whatever
arises under the Statute of Frauds." (.Atulrew v.
Babcock, 63 Conn. 109, 26 A. 715, 101 A.L.R. 961).
There is ample evidence in the record to show an
oral agreement by the parties to create the new joint
right of way involved herein and give the parties reciprocal rights to cross over the adjoining land of the
other. Otherwise, how does the respondent explain the
acts of the appellant in abandoning its only existing right
of way and demolishing its rental buildings to provide
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land for the new right of way and all of the other acts
of appellant and respondent in connection with the creation of the new right of way. Even though appellant
was required to furnish some right of way for respondent because of an earlier agreement, it would not have
<·hanged the location of this right of way which it needed
and was using if in so doing it lost its only existing right
of way and became subject to the permissve use and
eontrol of the respondent in the new right of way. There
was no reason for the appellant to have put itself In
this position, and the respondent has shown none.
The acts of the parties in performance support the
agreement as alleged. To hold otherwise would result
in fraud on the performing party.
"Part performance which will avoid statute
of frauds may consist of any act which puts party
performing in such position that nonperformance
by other would constitute fraud.'' (Utah M ercur
Gold Mine Co. v. Herschel Gold Min. Co., 103 Ut.
249, 134 P.2d 1094)
In the above referrd to Utah M ercur case the court
found that the part performance supported and took outside of the statute of frauds an oral agreement to extend
a written lease and in so doing used the folowing language:
"Whether the legal label given to the basis
of plaintiff's claimed right to continue in posssssion of the property is equitable estoppel, irrevocable license, or an oral contract for a written
extension taken out of the statute of frauds because of partial performance is not so important.
These concepts are but forms designed to serve
a more ultimate principle that no one shall induce
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another to act on promise of reward for such act
and then after obtaining the benefit of the same
repudiate the contract."
POINT III.
The Respondent is Estopped to Assert the Statute of
Frauds.

The courts have long since announced the fundamental rule that they will not allow the Statute of
Frauds to be used as a shield for fraud. The type of
fraud the courts have reference to is defined in 49 Am.
Jur., Statute of Frat~ds, Sec. 580, page 888 as follows:
"When one party induces another, on the
faith of a parol contract, to place himself in a
worse situation than he could have been if no
agreement existed, and especially if the former
derives a benefit therefrom at the expense of the
latter, and avails himself of his legal advantage,
he is guilty of a fraud and uses the statute for
a purpose not intended - the injury of another
- for his own profit. In such cases, ·equity regards the case as being removed from the statute
of frauds and will in proper cases enforce the
contract or otherwise interfere to prevent the application of the statute."
Conduct amounting to estoppel is described at ±9
.Am. Jur. Stattde of Frauds, Sec. 583, page 890 as
follows:
"The doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute of frauds against a clalin or defense based
upon an oral contract is founded upon the general
principles of estoppel in pais. The vital principle
is that he who by his language or conduct leads
another to do, upon the faith of an oral agreement, what he would not otherwise have done and

'
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changes his position to his prejudice, will not be
allowed to subject such person to loss or injury,
or to avail himself of that change to the prejudice
of such other party.''
These rules are so well accepted as to require no
further authority. The undisputed facts of this case fit
all the requirements of this rule·. On the faith of respondent's representation that a new joint right of way
would be created and in reliance on the acts of respondent in acquiring land that would be used as part of the
joint right of way, appellant tore down rental buildings
to make land available for part of the right of way,
abandoned its only existing right of way, and has continued to this day some 19 years later to use the new
right of way, and has used and developed its land in
reliance thereon.
POINT IV.
A Right of Way Over Respondent's Land Has Been
Created by Estoppel.

It is the accepted rule that an easement in land can
be created by estoppel.
"It seems to be the generally recognized
modern rule that the doctrine of estoppel in pais
may be successfully invoked to preclude an assertion of title to land; and it is generally recognized
that permitting the doctrine of estoppel to operate in effect to transfer real estate does not contravene the statute of frauds. One may by estoppel in pais be precluded from asserting an equitable title to land; and an estoppel in pais may be
asserted to raise an equitable title or interest in
land as against the legal title. The modern rule
is generally well settled that title to land or real
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property may pass by an equitable estoppel, which
is effectual to take title to land from one person
and vest it in another where justice requires that
such action be done." (49 Am. Jur., Statute of
F'rauds, Sec. 152, page 492)
While easements are usually created by express written grant, by prescription or by implication (and we feel
that an easement has been created by implication as will
be discussed later),
". . . it has long been recognized by the court
that an easement may exist by virtue of estoppeL"
(17A Am. Jur., Easements, Sec. 18, page 631)
"Notwithstanding the general rule as to the
prerequisites to its creation, an easement may
arise from an estoppel ... An easement by estoppel has been held to exist in a passageway over a
boundary strip as a result of the reciprocal use
of the strip by the adjoining owners as a passageway for a long period of time." (17A Am. Jur.,
Easements, Sec. 21, pp. 633-4)
In Forde v. L~bby, 22 Wyo. 464, 143 P. 1190, where
the land comprising the right of way was contributed by
both of the adjoining owners, the court said:
"The original owners who were parties to the
oral agreement, had become interested in maintaining said alley because their improve1nents had
been constructed with reference to it and its use
in connection with their improvement . . . The
easement was established by estoppel by the acts
and cond1tet of the original parties, and as between the1n, and upon the facts, they and their
grantors were each estopped from denying such
easement. It was as completely establiJshe.d as
between them and their privies, and subjects thet'r
parcels of land to the servitude as completely as
though it were created by a deed for that purpose."
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In Wright v. Barlow, 169 Okla. 472, 37 P. 2d 958, the
Oklahoma court cites with approval the Forde v. Libby
referred to immediately above and states :
"Courts of equity have declared that one or
his privies ought to be estopped and denied the
right to repudiate his acts when they have been
relied and acted on, and when to do so would
operate as a fraud or work an injustice. . . The
owner of land, by his acts in pais may preclude
himself from asserting his legal title .... ''
"Where owners of adjoining lots orally agree
on private way between lots and construct improvements with relation thereto, each is estopped from disputing the other's right of way."
The facts of this case support the creation of a right
of way by an equitable estoppel (estoppel in pais)
and also by reason of promissory estoppel. These two
kinds of estoppel shall be discussed as they fit the facts
of this case. Equitable estoppel will be referred to first.
"The doctrine of estoppel in pais is founded
upon principles of morality and fair dealing and
is intended to subserve the ends of justice . . .
Estoppel of this character arises from the conduct
of a party, using the word 'conduct' in its broadest meaning as including his spoken words, his
positive acts, and his silence when there is a duty
to speak. ... Accordingly, it holds a person to a
representation made or a position assumed where
otherwise inequitable consequences would result
to another who, having the right to do so, under
all the circumstances of the case, has in good faith
relied thereon and been misled to his injury." (19
Am. Jur., Estoppel, Sec. 42, pp. 640-42)
The essential elements of an equitable estoppel as
related to the party estopped and as related to the party
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claiming the estoppel are set out and discussed at 19 Am.
Jur., Estoppel, pp. 642-51 and 730-742. Each of these are
listed below and discussed as they fit the facts of this
case.
A.

As Related to the Party Estopped:
1. "Conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or at least,
which is calculated to convey the impression that
the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with,
those which the party subsequently attempts to
assert."

Respondent here openly acquired and made available
new land for use as part of the new right of way, observed the appellant tear down its rental buildings
to make its land available for part of the right of way,
acquiesced in the appellant and those claiming through it
to use the new right of way for many years, and knew
or had reason to know that appellant and those claiming
through it abandoned the only other existing right of
way.
2. "Intention, or at least expectation, that such
conduct shall be acted upon by the other party.
. . . An actual intent to mislead or defraud is not
essential. ... It is enough if there \Yas a holding
out to all who might have occasion to act of the
existence of a certain state of facts which they
might assume to be true and upon which they
might act.''
In this case, it could reasonably be assu1ned that appellant would act on the strength of the conduct of the
respondent, and it did in fact so act. It is not contended
that respondent necessarily had an intent to deceive or
mislead by its conduct, holding out, and acquiescence in
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connection with the creation and use of the right of way.
However, as already pointed out, it is not always necessary that a fraudulent purpose be present at the inception
of the transaction. 'The fraud may, and frequenly does,
consist in the subsequent attempt to controvert the representation (conduct) and to get rid of its effects and thus
injure the one who has relied on it.
3. "Knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real
facts.''
Respondent had actual knowledge that appellant was
tearing down its rental buildings to make land available
for part of the right of way. It knew that there were
several others who claimed the use of a right of way
through appellant and that appellant was obligated to
provide a right of way for them. Respondent kne-vv or
should have known that with the creation and use of the
new right of way, the old and only other existing right
of way was abandoned and allowed to be closed.
B.

As Related to the Party Asserting the Estoppel :
1. "Lack of knowledge and of the means of
knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question."

For many years after the creation of the new joint
right of way in this case, there was no question concerning the permanent right of appellant to use the newly
created right of way. Appellant's use has been uninterrupted and continuous. Appellant did not know and had
no means of knowing that respondent claimed that appellant had no permanent reciprocal right to cross over
that portion of the joint right of way owned by respondent. Respondent claims that a sign that was posted
should have conveyed this knowledge to appellant. In
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this regard, the evidence in its most favorable light to
respondent shows that there was a lapse of at least
several years before the first sign was posted. A detailed
discussion concerning any signs that were placed is set
out in Point VII below. Further, appellant contends, and
the prior understanding and course of conduct of respondent and appellant pertaining to the creation and use
of the right of way justifies such contention, that it did
not consider any signs, if placed, applied to it, but that
they applied to the general public.
2.

"Reliance on the conduct of the party estopped."

There is no question but what appellant in good faith
relied upon the conduct and representation of respondent
in participating in the creation of the right of way and
making it available to the use of appellant. But for this
reliance, appellant would not be in its present predicament.
3. "Action based on such reliance of such a character as to change his position prejudicially.''
In reliance on respondent's conduct and representation, appellant tore down its rental buildings and contributed its land to the right of way, lost the rental therefrom totaling at least $30.00 per n1onth, and abandoned
the only other existing right of way and allo·wed it to be
closed.
It is submitted that the undisputed evidence supplies
all of the above required elements and clearly supports
the creation of a right of way by equitable estoppel.
The creation of the joint right of way is also supported by promissory estoppel. The evidence in this case
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1nakes out a classic situation for the application of this
doctrine.
"There are numerous cases in which an estoppel has been predicated on promises or assurances as to future conduct." (19 Am. J ur. Promvssory Estoppel, Sec. 53, page 657)
The Restatement of the Law of Property, Vol. 5 on
Servit~tdes, Section 524, page 3173 sets forth a rule on
"Promises Enforceable by Estoppel" and a rationale that
fits perfectly the facts of this case as follows:

"An oral promise or representation that certain land will be used in a particular way, though
otherwise unenforceable, is enforceable to the extent necessary to protect expenditures made in
reasonable reliance upon it.
"Owners of neighboring lands are prone to
enter into informal agreements respecting the
future use of their respective lands in which each
agrees to use his land in a way that will benefit the
other. The relationship of trust and confidence
frequently existing between neighbors tends to
produce a very considerable degree of casualness
and informality in their dealings with each other.
Adjustments in improvement and use are frequently made on the basis of their informal understandings. If the observance of these understandings is not compelled, much hardship may result.
To prevent such hardship, informal agreements to
use land are enforced to the extent necessary to
protect those who have acted in reasonable reliance upon them. . . .''
"The phrase 'though otherwise unenforceable'
as here used means that the promise could not be
enforced were it not for the application of the
doctrines of estoppel.''
23
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is discussed at 19 Am. Jur. Estoppel, Sec. 53, page
658, as follows:
"The doctrine of promissory estoppel is most
widely recognized and most frequently applied
in cases of promises or representations as to an
intended abandonment of existing rights."
The facts of this case fall ''rithin this specific application of promissory estoppel. Respondent acquired the
land cmnprising its portion of the joint right of way and
represented and agreed that appellant would have a right
to the use of it as a means of access to its property, and
in pursuance of this right, the appellant has used the
joint right of way for many years. By joining in the creation of the new right of way and agreeing to appellant's
right of use, the respondent represented that it was giving up or abandoning a valuable and existing right and
relinquishing part of its fee title in its part of the land
that was used in creating the right of way. In reliance
on this representation of the abandonment of an existing
right, the appellant abandoned its only other existing
right of way, tore down sheds, lost rentals, and contributed a portion of the land for the new right of way.
The facts of this case bring it squarely within promissory estoppel rule set down in Ravarino· v. Price, Utah
260 P. 2d 570 as follows:
"Generally, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable only when a 1nisrepresentation is
made as to past or present facts; however an
exception is recognized "'When a misrepresentation
as to the future operates as an abandonment of
an existing right on the part of the party making
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the misrepresentation. 21 C.J. 1142, Bigelow on
Estoppel, (6th Ed.) 637). .Actually this exception
is a limited application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 31 C.J.S., Estoppel Par. 80. The
general principal of promissory estoppel is em:bodied in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Sec. 90, under the heading of 'Informal
Contracts, \Vithout Assent or Consideration,' as
follows:
'A promise which the promissor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
of a definite and substantial character on the part
of the promisee and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by the enforcement of the promise.'
"Promissory estoppel is historically rooted as
a substitute for consideration, Allegheny Colleoe
v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y.
369, 159 N.E. 173, 57 A.L.R. 980, per Cardozo, C.J.
citing 1 Williston on Contracts, Sections 116, 139;
however it is applied where the promise of the
promisor as to his future conduct constitutes the
intended abandonment of an existing right on
his part. In Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 211
P. 2d 806, the defendant induced the plaintiff to
refrain from commencing action on a promissory
note by representations that he would not invoke
statute of limitations as a bar. The court held the
defendant was estopped from raising the defense
of the statute, basing its decision on cases where
the promisor had manifested an intention to abandon an existing right, and quoting the Restatement
of Contracts, Sec. 90. For similar illustrations,
see Schroeder v. Young, 161 U.S. 334, 16 S. Ct.
512, 40 L. Ed. 721; Faxon v. Faxon, 28 Mich., 159;
Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 25 L. Ed. 618;
3 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 689, p. 1988.
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"The common element in these cases is that
the promise as to future conduct constitutes a
manifestation that the promissor will abandon
an existing right which he possesses."
POINT V.
There is an Implied Agreement Creating a Joint
and Reciprocal Right of Way Over the Adioining Lands
of the Parties.

If the court is of the opinion that there was no express oral agreement, there is ample evidence to show
an implied agreement to vest in appellant a right to the
use of the new right of way.

The Restate1nent of the Law of Contracts, 8ec. 5,
states how a promise may be made:
" ... A prmnise in a contract must be stated
in such words either oral or written, or must be
inferred wholly or partly from such conduct, as
justifies the promisee in understanding that the
promissor intended to make a promise."

The following concerning in1plied contracts is set out
at 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Sec. 4 p. 498:
"In an express contract all the terms and
conditions are expressed between the parties,
while in an implied contract, son1e one or n1ore
of the terms and conditions are implied frmn the
conduct of the parties."
The rule of implied contracts is further stated as follows:
"Express contracts are those in which the
terms of the agreement are fully and openly incorporated at the time the contracts are entered
into, while implied contracts are such as arise by
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legal inference and upon principles of reason and
justice from certain facts, or where there i!S circumstantial evidence showing that the parties intended to make a contract. (McDonald v. Thompson, 184 U.S. 71, 46 L. Ed. 437, 22 S. Ct. 297).
In 27 ALR 2d 332 there is a discussion of the problem
of mutual or cornmon use by adjoining owners, for a
common purpose, of a strip of land owned in part by each.
In the summary and comment the compiler at page 338
states the following concerning an implied oral agreement:
"A use by adjoining owners, for a common
purpose, of a strip of land over and along their
boundary strongly suggests s.ome kind of agreement therefor, and in most cases the fair ~mpli
cation has been that the use originated in a mere
oral agreement.''
The creation of the new right of way herein required
and involved the following specific actions and conduct
on the part of the appellant and respondent, all of which
are undisputed in the record and from which an agreement can be implied:
1. Appellant tore down at least three storage sheds
owned by it to provide the east part of the land necessary
to make the new right of way.
2. The appellant has lost rentals at the rate of at
least $30.00 per month since that time from such sheds.
(R. 108, 109)
3. Appellant assisted in the actual physical preparation and building of the right of way.

4.
south.

Appellant abandoned its only right of way to the
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5. Appellant has directed the use and improvement
of its property in reliance on the use of the right of way.
6. Respondent acquired at a cost of less than
$200.00 (R. 121, 135, 136) the land necessary for the west
part of the right of way.

Each party executed and delivered deeds to Salt
Lake City covering the land owned by each which comprised the right of way and joined in reqeusting that it
be dedicated as a public highway.
7.

8. For many years the right of way was jointly
used with no notice of claimed permissive use or claim
for rental arising.
It is inconceivable that such specific action was taken
by the parties without an intention in both parties as to
the right of way so created. There is ample testimony
in the record that conversations were had by the parties
preceding and during these actions which make out such
an intention and assent.
"The statute of frauds cannot operate as a
defense to the creation of an easement by implication.
"It should be noted that even though a grant
of an easement is embraced within the operation
of the statute of frauds and must consequently be
in writing, an executed parol grant of easement
will be upheld and sustained under the same circumstances and upon the same principles that a
parol contract would similarly be sustained.'' (49
Am. Jur., Statute of Frauds, Sec. 182, p. 514)
This Court within the past few months has had occasion to apply the law of ilnplied agreements in the two
Utah land dispute cases of Harding v. Allen, 353 P. 2d
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911, and Johnson Real Estate Co. v. Nielson, 353 P. 2d
918. While these were boundary dispute cases, they involved the same principles as the case herein and the
establishment of the rights of the adjoining landowners
based on their long period of conduct in regard to their
land. These cases both referred to two earlier cases of
Ringwood v. Bradford, 2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P. 2d 1053 and
Brown v. Mulliner, 120 Utah 16, 25, 232 P. 2d 202, 207
and quoted the following:
". . . in the absence of evidence that the owners of adjoining property or their predecessors
in interest ever made an express parol agreement
as to the location of the boundary between them,
if they occupied their respective premises up to
an open boundary line visibly marked by monuments, fences or buildings for a long period of
time and mutually recognized it as the dividing
line between them, the law will imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located, if it can do
so consistently with the facts appearing and will
not permit the parties nor their grantees to depart from such line."
It is also noted in the concurring opinion in Hummel
v. Young, Utah, 265 P. 2d 410 which refers to the early
case of Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009 that the
establishment of an express agree1nent in situations involving principles similar to what we are here concerned
with is not necessary nor controlling.
The undisputed specific actions of the parties cannot
be reasonably accounted for except on the postulate that
an agreement or understanding (express or implied)
existed as to the use of the newly created right of way
as contended by appellant.
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POINT VI.
The Roadway Has Been Dedicated and Abandoned
to the Use of the Public in Accordance with 27-1-2
U.C.A. 1953.

Public use which constitutes dedication is defined
by 27-1-2 U.C.A. 1953 as follows:
"A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when
it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years."
The undisputed records of the Salt Lake City Recorder's office show that in 1942, which was within a few
months afer the creation of the joint right of way, the
parties each executed and delivered deeds conveying their
respective parcels of land making up the right of way to
the City with the request that the right of way be dedicated as a public highway which would be an extension
of Elm Avenue in that area. At that time the general
public was using it as an access to all the property in
the area and as a means of a short cut through to Highland Drive. The City finally decided not to dedicate the
right of way. However, respondent's conduct in regard
to the right of way did not change, and the same general
public use of the right of way that existed at the time
of the execution of the deeds and request for dedication,
continued thereafter on even a more expanded basis for
more than the required statutory ten year period and,
in fact, continues to this day. Respondent contends that
subsequently there were placed signs as to permissive use,
but the evidence shows that these were not placed until
after the right of way had been used by the general
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public for more than ten years. The question of the signs
is discussed in detail in Point VII below and applies in
full force to the argument on the point under discussion
here.
The Utah Court rn the early case of Schettler v.
Lynch, 23 Ut. 305, 64 Pac. 955 set out rules as to what
amounts to the dedication of a public highway which have
been followed in a series of cases since that time:
"A dedication may be express or implied....
If the intention to dedicate is manifest, it is sufficient. An implied dedication is founded on the
doctrine of ~equitable estoppel ; and when land has
been thus set .apart as a highway for the use of the
public, for their convenience and accommodation,
and enjoyed as such, and private and individual
rights acquired in relation to it, 'the law' as s.aid
by the Supreme Court of the United States, 'considers it in the nature of an estoppel in pais, which
precludes the original owner from revoking such
dedication.' City of Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet.
431, 8 L. Ed. 452. And such an appropriation of
land is not within the statute of frauds, and may
be established by parol evidence showing the acts
and conduct of the owner of the land. In fact, an
implied dedication of land for public use as a highway may be established in any conceivable way by
which the intent of the owner can be made apparent. . . . 'If the open and known acts are of
such character as to induce the belief that the
owner intended to dedicate the way to public use,
and the public and individuals act upon such conduct, proceed as if there had been in fact a dedication, and acquire rights which would be lost if the
owner were allowed to reclaim the land, then the
law will not permit him to assert that there was
no intent to dedicate no matter what may have
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been his secret intent.' Elliott, Roads and 8.,
pp. 92, 93."
The decision of the City Commission not to formally
dedicate the deeded property as a public street did not
mean that the way could not become a public highway
pursuant to 27-1-2 U.C.A. 1953. In the Utah case of
Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 116 P. 2d 420, in which the Court
sustained the dedication of a public way it stated:
"It has been held by numerous courts that the
grant may be accepted by public use without
formal action by public authorities, and that
continued use of the road by the public for such
length of time and under such circumstances as
to clearly indicate an intention on the part of the
public to accept the grant is sufficient.''
(Many cases are there cited which support this
rule)
In the recent Utah case of Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah
2d 395, 326 P. 2d 107, this Court held that there was
sufficient evidence as a matter of law to establish the
dedication of a public highway and used the following
language in considering the type of use and the acceptance required of the public:
"The use of he road was not great because
comparatively few people had need to travel over
it, but those of the public who had such need, did
so."
". . . An acceptance could be made 'by public
use without formal action by public authorities.
and that continued use of the road by the public
for such length of time and under such circumstances as to clearly indicate an intention on the
part of the public to accept the grant is sufficient'." (Reference being made by the Court to
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Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 75 Utah
384, 285 p. 646)
"This evidence was sufficient as a matter of
law to establish a highway by dedication and the
court erred in finding otherwise. The highway
once having been established by such use, it is
provided by statute, Sec. 27-1-3 U.C.A. 1953, that
it. . . must continue to be a highway until abandoned by order of the Board of County Commissioners.' "
There is, therefore, ample Utah authority and express statutory provision to support the dedication of a
public highway in this case.
POINT VII.
There Were No Signs Placed Which Prevented the
Creation of the Joint and Reciprocal Right of Way By
Any of the Means Referred to by Appellant.

The evidence shows that there were no signs of any
kind posted by the respondent concerning the use of its
portion of the right of way for several years. (R. 93, 99,
167, 101-2) Further, the evidence shows that when the
large first sign was finally posted, it served only to direct
people to respondent's place of business and "service
entrance" and contained no language purporting to limit
or restrict the use of its portion of the right of way.
(Ex. P-5) It was only in recent years about the time respondent filed its suit in 1954 that a second and smaller
sign was placed which had language pertaining to permissive use. (R. 99, 102, 138, 146) A superficial examination of the two signs shown in Exhibit P-5 upon which
respondent relies indicates they are not of the same age
or era. The smaller permissive use sign is not the same
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material, construction or printing. These together with
its very manner and location tell that it was placed as a
recent after-thought as is contended by appellant.
Finally, the alleged posting of any restrictive signs
would be entirely repugnant and inconsistent with the
conduct and manifest intention of the parties originally
and over a long period of time as has been discussed
above. The idea of permissive use is one given recent
birth by respondent for reasons that will he discussed
below.
The respondent relies on the signs shown in its
Exhibit P -5 to defeat the right of appellant in respondent's portion of the right of way. However, the sign
painter called as a witness by respondent to establish
when such signs were placed, testified that he did not
place them, (R. 156) did not service them, (R. 156) and
did not know when they were placed (R. 157) His testimony therefore did not establish when either of the signs
were placed.
The respondent attempted to establish the time of
placing and he wording of signs by a witness who is an
owner and secretary-treasurer of the respondent company. This witness testified to a sign being posted for
"as long as I ren1ember," (R. 160) but there is no testimony from him as to the specific language of the sign
or signs except that Exhibit P-5 contains "a modern
version." (R. 160-1) This same witness testified on cross
examination that he had no memory of any of appellant's
rental sheds which extended entirely across appellant's
land and which required tearing down to create the right
of way and no memory of the actual tearing down of these
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sheds to make the land available for the right of way.
(H. 161) In view of the undisputed facts that these sheds
did so exist and that they were actually torn down to
make appellant's land available for the right of way,
and that this occurred at about the same general time
that the posting of some sign was remembered to have
taken place, this court in reviewing the evidence in this
equity case is justified in questioning such memory of
this witness pertaining to the placing of signs and what
they said.
The limited knowledge of this witness and the other
officer witness referred to below concerning the facts
of this case is demonstrated by their testimony that it
was not until 1954 that they had any knowledge that
appellant owned the eastern portion of the land comprising the right of way. (R. 165)
Respondent next attempted to establish the time of
placing of signs by testimony of a witness who is an
owner and who is now president and has always been
general manager of the respondent company. He remembered of a sign being placed about 1944, but he did
not state what this sign may have said. (R. 167) He remembered acquiring the land from which to provide
respondent's portion of the right of way and of selling
off part of such land, but he did not have any recollection
as to about how much was paid for it or how much was
received for the portion sold. (R. 168) The undisputed
evidence is that the cost of the original parcel of land acquired by respondent was $300 and that a portion of it
was sold for $120 and that, therefore, the cost of the land
contributed by respondent for the right of way was less
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than $200. (R. 121, 135, 136)
Certainly none of this testimony reviewed in its most
favorable light is either convincing or clear as to what
sign or signs may have been placed, when they were
placed, and what they said. It is, however, significant
for two reasons. First, assuming that the large first
sign was placed as early as 1944 as contended by the general manager and that it contained permissive use language, (both of which assumptions are controverted by
other evidence and are repugnant to the theory and basis
upon which the right of way was created) there elapsed at
least a three year period of time in which the appellant
was allowed unrestricted use of the right of way and
during which time the appellant abandoned its only existing other right of way and otherwise changed its position
as has been referred to herein. In such length of time
and under such circumstances the appellant acquired a
right over respondent's portion of the right of way by
estoppel if not by any of the other means discussed in
this brief. Second, this testimony gives a clue as to why
the respondent would want to now deny and refuse the
interest .of the appellant in the right of way. The cost of
the land acquired by respondent and made available for
its part of the right of way at the time of its creation was
about $200.00. (R. 121, 135, 136). The testimony of the
general manager of the respondent now puts the value
of this piece of land at $20,000.00. (R. 167)
On cross examination of appellant's witness, Mr.
Richards, respondent endeavored to fix the time of placing the signs shown in Exhibit P -5. The testimony is not
at all clear that Mr. Richards understood what signs
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and what locations were being referred to in the course
of the cross examination. (R. 122-4) Under careful leading, the witness stated that there may have been a sign
up for as much as ten years, but he was not at all sure.
This witness recognized that there were two different
signs and that they probably went up at different times.
This is consistent with other evidence which showed that
when the first of any signs was posted, it was directional
only, and that the permissive use sign was posted about
1954 and after strong feelings had arisen between the
successor representatives of the parties. (R. 99, 102, 138,
146) ·This witness was unequivocal on cross examination
that this new right of way was to be a substitute for the
old one which would be closed and that the new right of
way would always be left open. (R.120, 122)
The former secretary of the appellant company testified that he was connected with such company unil 1945
and that there were no signs of any kind posted up to that
time (R. 102) and that the signs in question were posted
when the rig~t to the use of the right of way was questioned by the 1954 filing of the lawsuit for rent by respondent. (R.94,99,101,102,146)
The owner of the appellant company testified definitely that there were two different signs posted by respondent on the right of way property. These were
posted at different times. The earlier one was directional only to the respondent's business. The later one
had to do with permissive use and was posted in 1954 at
about the time the suit for rent was filed by respondent.
(R. 138, 140, 146).
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Some of the most convincing evidence that the permissive use question was not raised by respondent until
recent years is provided by respondent's own Exhibit P -5.
All evidence points to the large sign predating the small
sign shown in the exhibit. The preponderance of the evidence is that the small permissive use sign did not appear
until about the time respondent questioned appellant's
right to use the right of way by the filing of the suit in
1954. A very close examination of the large sign will
show that originally this sign served as a directional
sign only. There can he seen showing through the white
painted arrow the old original words "Service Entrance"
even though an attempt has been made to paint them
out. Unwittingly the respondent has been betrayed by its
own exhibit. Certainly this adds credence to the contention of appellant that for many years the appellant and
others used the right of way without any notice or restriction by respondent and is compatible with every
point relied upon by appellant to give it a right to the
use of the way.
This is the sum total of the evidence as to signs
posted, and we submit, that there is no showing that a
sign was posted that would prevent the creation of the
joint right of way and the vesting of reciprocal rights
of the parties in and to the use of it or that would have
prevented the establishment of a public way.

POINT VIII.
It Was Error to Set Aside Respondent's Default
Judgme·nt on the Counterclaim.

The setting aside of the default after the expiration
of more than three months time after its entry was error
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and directly contrary to the explicit provisions of Rule
60(b) U.R.C.P. that a motion for such relief based upon
"mistake, inadvertence, surpr?Jse, or excusable neglect"
shall not be made more than three months after the judgment or order was entered or taken.
Added emphasis is given the consideration of this
point in the light of the history of the suit which shows
an almost utter lack of interest in it on the part of respondent.
It is significant that this action all started on March
30, 1954, by the filing of a complaint by respondent in an
attempt to recover rent from appellant for its use of respondent's portion of the joint right-of-way. Prior
thereto, there had been no notice of claim for rent made
in the more than thirteen years in which the parties had
reciprocally used the pracels of land making up the joint
right-of-way. The little merit placed in that complaint by
respondent is graphically demonstrated by the fact that
respondent did virtually nothing to advance that suit for
nearly six years, and respondent subsequently underlined
its lack of faith in its merits by dismissing the complaint
on the morning of the trial on October 8, 1959.
Several years after the filing of the complaint, it
became apparent that appellant would have to move to
clear its right to the use of the right-of-way which had
been put in question by this suit. On September 9, 1958,
appellant served and filed a notice and motion to amend
its answer. No one had interest enough to appear at the
hearing on the motion. Leave was granted by the Court
to file the amended answer and counterclaim, and a copy
was duly served on respondent on September 24, 1958.
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Respondent still did nothing and did not reply to the
counterclaim, and on Ocober 22, 1958, the default of the
respondent was entered. More than four months later
on January 27, 1959, a default judgment was granted and
entered giving appellant a permanent right to the use of
the right-of-way. Respondent moved to set aside the
judgment on February 6, 1959 on the grounds of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise and excusable neglect," and
this was granted 1\larch 18, 1959.
Rule 60 (b) as it pertains to the setting aside of a default on the grounds claimed by respondent reads as follows:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court n1ay in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons : ( 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; ... The motion shall be made
for reason(s) (1), not more than three months
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken .... "
The federal rule 60 (b) on this point is identical
with the Utah rule except that the arbitrary time limitation is one year. The federal cases have uniformly treated this time limitation as inflexible and jurisdictional
when relief under the rule is sought on the ground of
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."
The rule is stated in Barron & Holtzoff, Federal
PractiJce and Procedttre (Rules Edition) Volume 3, Section 1330, p. 265 as follows:
"Rule 60 (b) governs the time within which a
motion mu,st be rnade for relief from a judgment
40
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

for any of the reasons or grounds enumerated ...
Motions grounded on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence
or fraud or misconduct of a party must be made
not later 'than one year after the judgment, order,
or proceeding was entered or taken'.''
The following are quotations from cases construing
and applying the language of federal rule 60 (b) covering
judgments, orders, or proceedings, the relief from which
governed by the specific time limitation of the rule. In
reading these cases it should be remembered that the
language of the federal rule and the Utah rule is identical
on this point except the federal time limitation prior to
1948 was six months and after that is one year.
"After expiration of six months, Court was
without authority to relieve defendant from an
order of default.'' Cassell v. Barnes, D.C.D.C.
1940, 1 F.R.D. 15.
"The one year limitation prescribed in Rule
60 (b) for filing of motion by defendant for vacation of default and judgment entered thereon reflects the extreme period within which the motion
might be made, and it must be made within a
reasonable time which may conceivably be less
than one year from entry of judgment." Woods v.
Severson, D.C. Neb. 1949, 9 F.R.D. 84.
"District Court had no jurisdiction to strike
out order dismissing cause without prejudice for
want of prosecution, where motion to strike order
and restore case to calendar was not made until
more than six months after entry of the order of
dismissal." Reed v. South Atlantic S. S. Co. of
Delaware, D.C. Del. 1942, 2 F.R.D. 475.
There are many other similar cases cited under Sec.
1330 of Barron & I-Ioltzoff referred to above.
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The United States Supreme Court has ruled on federal rule 60 (h) on a number of occasions. The most recent case was Ackennan v. U.S., Texas, 71 S. Ct. 209, 340
U.S. 193, 95 L. Ed. 207. This case invloved a motion to
set aside a judgment canceling a certificate of naturalization for the reason of "excusable neglect" under Rule
60(b). The motion was filed after the express time limitation pro~ided by the rule. The Supreme Court affirmed
the action of the District ·Court in denying the motion and
stated:
"A party's motion for relief from a judgment
on the ground that his failure to appeal therefrom
is excusable is a motion for relief because of 'excusable neglect,' as provided in Rule 60 (b) (1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and hence
must, by the terms of the Rule, be made not more
than one year after the judgment was entered....
It is immediately apparent that no relief on
account of 'excusable neglegt' was available to this
petitioner on the motion under consideration."
This Court has held that an equity court no longer
has complete discretion in granting or denying relief
from a default judgment hut is bound by the prescribed
three months time of Rule 60(b) when relief is sought
on any of the specified grounds (including "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect") referred to
in the Rule to which this time applies. To hold otherwise,
would nullify the express time limitation language of
the Rule.
The Utah case of W.arren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260
P. 2d 741 in~olved an attempt to set aside a default judgment on the grounds of excusable neglect in a quiet title
suit 90 days afer the answer was due and 64 days after
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default had been entered. This court affirmed the district
court's refusal to set aside the default judgment and
stated:
"To hold ... that they have the right to have
the case reopened since they personally received
no notice of the action would be to undermine
the Rules which are positive in their application
and are designed to expedite litigation.''
"And although a judgment may be erroneous
and inequitable, equitable relief will not be granted to a party thereto on the sole ground that the
negligence of the attorney, agent, trustee, or other
representative of the present complainant prevented a fair trial. Restatement of Judgments,
Sec. 126."
The recent Utah case of Ney v. Harr~son, 299 P. 2d
1114, reaffirms that where relief under Rule 60(b) is
sought upon any of the first four specified grounds set
out in 60 (b) (of which "mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect" are lumped together as the first
of the four specified grounds), it must be sought within
three months from the entry of the default judgment. In
fact, the Court used the following precise language in
regard to the time limitation in which relief must be
sought as follows :
"Relief upon the first four grounds must be
sough within three months from the entry of judgment."
The Court in the Ney case did grant relief from the
judgment because of a showing under Reason ( 7) of Rule
60(b). The time limitation for seeking relief under R,eason (7) is "a reasonable time.'' In theN ey case, the Court
pointed out that:
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''Defendant Aida did not request relief until
nearly eleven months had elapsed and, hence, the
only applicable section of Rule 60 (b) on which he
could rely was (7)."
It is clear that the respondent did not intend or attempt to invoke relief under Reason (7) of Rule 60(b) but
in the second paragraph of its l\fotion to Set Aside Default Judgm.ent (R. 19) respondent uses the express language of Reason (1) of Rule 60(b) to-wit: "mistake, inadvertence, surprise and excusable neglect." Further, the
N ey case recognizes the rule set down in the Warren v.
D~xon Ranch Company case (supra) that:

"An equity court no longer has complete discretion in granting or denying relief."
The intention of the rules to fix an inflexible time
limitation for the seeking of relief under Rule 60(b) is
clearly demonstrated by the reference made to it in Rule
6(b) U.R.C.P. having to do generally with the enlargement of time. Rule 6 (b) permits the enlargement of the
time wherein an act is required or allowed to he done at
or within a specified time, .where the failure to act was a
result of an excusable neglect but it provides that the
Court may not extend the time limitations set out in
Rule 60 (b) in which action for relief thereunder must be
taken. Rule 6(b) reads as follows:
"(b) Enlargement. \Vhen by these rules or
by a notice given thereunder or bY order of court
an act is required or allowed to be· done at or within a specified tin1e, the court for cause shown 1nay
at any time in its discretion (1) with or ·without
motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the
period originally prescribed or as extended by a
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previous order or ( 2) upon motion made after
the expiration of the specified period permit the
act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend
the time for taking any action under Rules 25,
50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e), 60(b), and 73(a)
and (g), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.''
Reading Rules 60(b) and 6 (b) together, it must be
concluded that it is the intention of the rules to make
the time limitation in which a party must move for relief
because of Reason (1) of Rule 60(b) a definite and inflexible time limitation. In fact, the last portion of Rule
6(b) is a direct injunction that the court may not extend
the time for taking action under Reason (1) of Rule
60(b). The federal court expressly and unequivocally
so held in Wallace v. U.S. C.C.A. 2d 142 F. 2d 240 certiorari denied 65 S. Ct. 37, 323 U.S. 712, 89 L. Ed. 573.
The default of the respondent was entered on October 21, 1958, and the judgment entered on January 27,
1959. The respondent has contended that the three
months time limitation of Rule 60 (b) did not begin to
run until the date of entry of the judgment on January
27, 1959. The relief sought under Rule 60(b) is from a
"final judgment, order, or proceeding." Further, the Utah
Court in the early case of Cutle-r v. Haycock, 32 U. 354,
90 P. 2d 897, ruled that the entry of the default is the controlling act and the thing from which relief must be
sought. This court there stated:
" . . . Where a default has been rightfully
entered, a party cannot thereafter, as at matter of
right, arrest the entering of judgment on the default by simply filing a pleading with the clerk.
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In order to do this he should obtain leave to file
it from the Court."
It is submitted that if respondent's alleged "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect'' is viewed
against the background of respondent's marked lack of
attention to and interest in this case through the years
after respondent had initiated it, there is actually no
such showing of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" that would support the invoking of
Reason (1) of Rule 60(b) even if relief had been sought
within the three month period required by the Rule. Even
if relief is sought within the time limitation of the Rule,
it is addressed to the discretion of the court and must be
based on a good excuse for the default.
"A motion to set aside a default or a judgment by default is addressed to the discretion of
the court. . . . In moving to set aside a judgment
by default the defendant must show both that
there was good reason for the default and that he
has a meritorious defense to the action. . . . A
motion to set aside a judgment by default on the
ground of neglect of counsel to file an answer has
been denied where it was not shown that the neglect was excusable.... " (Barron and Holtzoff,
Federal Practice and Procedure, Rules Edition,
Vol. 3, Sec. 1217, pp. 53-4)
The failure of the respondent to file a reply to the
counterclaim nearly five months after the filing and service of it .and nearly four months after entry of default
falls into the pattern and routine established by respondent in connection with this case as has been previously
referred to in detail and is not excusable. Respondent,
therefore, did not qualify for relief under Rule 60 (b)
either as to time or substance.
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POINT IX.
The Failure of the Trial Court to Rule Upon the
Incompetency of Witnesses to Testify on Particular Matters
Was Preiudicial Error.

The provisions of 78-21-3 U.C.A., 1953 require the
court to decide on all questions of law, and reads as follows:
"All questions of law, including the admissibility of evidence, the facts preliminary to such
admissions, the construction of statutes and other
writings, and the application of the rules of evidence are to be decided by the Court and all discussions of law addressed to it."
The court failed to rule on any of the objections
raised as to the competency of all witnesses for the appellant to testify concerning conversations and dealings had
by such witnesses with the original representatives of the
parties concerning the creation and projected use of the
joint right of way. (R. 86, 88, 96, 116, 132, 135, 153-4)
The Memorandum of Decision of the Trial Court (R.
45) found as follows:
"1. That there was never an agreement between the parties creating an interest in the defendant in and to the right of way involved in this
action."
Objections were made to the competency of these witnesses to testify concerning any agreement. The court reserved its ruling until the conclusion of trial, but never
did rule. We are, therefore, at a loss to know what, if any,
testimony of appellant's witnesses was considered or not
considered in making the finding that there never was
an agreement between the parties creating an interest
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in the defendant in and to the right of way. It is submitted that the failure of the court to so rule was prejudicial. If there had been a ruling, the appellant would
have had an opportunity to meet the objection and present additional or other evidence by further interrogation of these witnesses or with other witnesses or by more
extended cross-examination of respondent's witnesses,
and through the possible use of additional documentary
evidence.
The rules in this regard are set out as follows:
"A ruling on objections to evidence or motions
to strike evidence should be made as soon as
possible, either at the time the objections or motion is made, or during the trial and before judgment rendered, in time to give the opposite party
the opportunity to meet the objection. The better
practice is to rule positively, one way or the other,
when the evidence is offered.... If, however, evidence is received subject to objection, without a
ruling thereon, a ruling should be made prior to
the conclusion of the trial, and in time for the
party to present his case with respect to such
ruling. . . . "
"Improper evidence should not be admitted at
counsel's risk, but should be excluded in express
terms or the intention of the court to exclude the
evidence made clearly to appear." (88 C.J.S. Trml,
Sec. 145, pp. 289-290; Mayer v. Detroit, etc. R. Co.,
152 :Mich. 276, Lo·uisville, etc. R. Co. v. Collinsworth, 45 Fla. 403, 33 So. 513, Colltns v. Janesville, 111 Wis. 348, 87 N.W. 241, 1087, Stephens v.
Harris, 180 Ark. 128, 20 S.W. 2d 866.
"A distinct ruling, should be made upon an
objection immediately-in most cases-after the
objection is interposed. It is not commendable
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practice to reserve a ruling on an objection, or to
admit evidence subject to a motion to strike to
be argued later; in fact, such practice in some
cases constitutes prejudicial error." (2 Bancroft's
Code, Practice, and Remedies, Section 1371, page
1843)
If the court had ruled on these objections, counsel
would have had a right and opportunity to request the
court for its reasons for so ruling. The rule in this regard
is set out at 88 C.J.S. Trial, Section 145, p. 289 as follows:
"Indeed, counsel who is unable to comprehend
the reason for the exclusion of evidence is entitled,
on request, to a statement from the court of its
reasons for exclusion. Evidence cannot be excluded without assigning a reason, where the
probability is that the reason for the exclusion
could have been obviated if known."
The following are quotations from cases applying
the above referred to rules:
"In the case of Gilcrest v. Bowen, 95 Mont. 44,
24 P .2d 141, this court condemned the practice
of trial judges taking objections under advisement
and not thereafter disposing of the same by an appropriate ruling. And again, in Langston v. Currie, 95 Mont. 57 26 P. 2d 160 vve expressly approved what was said in the Gilcrest Case, and
forecast that eventually it would be necessary for
this court to reverse a cause before it because of
the failure of the trial court to dispose of objections or motions which had arisen during the
progress of the trial ; we again repeat the prophecy there made." (Frisbee v. Coburn, Mont., 52
P. 2d, p. 882)
"A judge presiding at the trial of a case
should rule promptly and clearly upon each and
49
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

every objection or motion which is made by the
attorneys, thus not only affording the parties
the benefit of his judgment and guidance as to the
future conduct of the trial, but also making a
crystal clear record for the assistance of an appellate court when reviewing his action." (Los
Angeles County v. Beve.rley, 271 P 2d 965)
In view of the above, the failure of the court to rule
on these objections was clearly prejudicial to the presentation of appellant's case.
POINT X.
The Findings of the Court are Not Responsive to and
Do Not Cover All of the Material Issues.

The following language of Rule 52, U.R.C.P. requires
the court to make findings :
"In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall, unless the same are waived, find the facts specially
and state separately is conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment;"
Rule 52 also also expressly provides that "Requests
for findings are not necessary for purpose of review."
This, of course, is the necessary corrallary to the direction of the Rule that the facts must be found specially.
It is reversible error to fail to find on all material
issues. This rule is stated at 3 Am. Jur., Appeal & Error,
Sec. 1147, p. 660, as follows:
"The failure or refusal of the trial court to
make findings of facts material to the decision
is ground for reversal on appeal by a party prejudiced thereby;"
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The only material issue found by the court and as set
out in its memorandum decision (R. 45) was "that there .
was never an agreement between the parties creating an
interest in the defendant in and to the right of way involved in this action." Further, this is the only material
finding set out in the findings prepared by respondent
and signed and filed by the court. (R. 58)
There were no findings on either of the following
material issues which were raised by the pleadings and
supported by evidence:
Appellant acquired an interest in the right of
way by estoppel. The evidence shows that in reliance
on the conduct of respondent, appellant changed its position to its detriment and prejudice and to the benefit
of respondent all as alleged in the pleadings and as has
been detailed earlier in this brief. Appellant in substance
pleaded into estoppel in its First Amended Answer and
Counterclaim (R. 9) and urged and argued relief on this
issue during the course of the trial in the light of the evidence. adduced, although the reporter's transcript does
not contain a record of the argument of counsel. Appellant specifically pleaded estoppel in its Motion to Amend
to conform to the evidence and in its Answer and Counterclaim that was amended to conform to the evidencPand filed by leave of the court after hearing thereon. (R.
48, 65)
1.

2. The right of way has been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public in accordance with 27-1-2
V:C.A. 1953. This became apparent in the course of the
evidence adduced at the trial and was specifically pleaded
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in appellant's Motion to Amend to conform to the evi• dence and in its Answer and Counterclaim that was
amended to conform to the evidence and filed. (R. 53, 68)
The Utah court has held n1any times that the failure
to find on all material issues is reversible error.
''The court should find the facts upon every
issue, either affirmatively or negatively, as the
evidence may be, and thus give the defeated party
an opportunity to assail the finding as not being
supported by the evidence. The court erred in not
making findings upon the issue of want of authority, and also upon the issue of renunciation
of the contract." (Thomas v. Clayton Piano Co.,
47 Ut. 91, 151 P. 543)
"The law is well settled that the findings when
compared with the pleadings must be within the
issues and be responsive thereto, and must cover
the material issues raised by the pleadings,
whether they arise because of allegations in the
complaint and, denied by the ans\Yer, or upon affirmative defense pleaded in the answer, or upon
a counterclaim, denied by answer thereto or treated as denied, and this is required whether evidence be introduced or not upon such issues, and
if there be no finding upon a material issue the
judg1nent cannot be supported." (Parowan Mercantile Co. v. Gurr, et al., lTtah, 30 P.2d 207)
The most recent Utah case of Gaddis Investment Co.
et al. v. Morris on, 3 Ut. 2d 43, 278 P. 2d 284 interpreted
what is required in the way of findings by the court under
Rule 52. In this case, the defendant's ansVi;r;er raised the
issue of abandonment of the contract but the trial court
made no finding regarding it. The judgment was set
aside and the case remanded. This Court in that case
quoted the language of Rule 52 and stated:
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"It appears that the judgment was based
principally upon the findings that the contract
was entered into and the commission had not been
paid, totally disregarding defendant's answer to
the complaint. It has been frequently held that
the failure of the trial court to make findings of
fact on all material issues is reversible error
where it is prejudicial.''
The court in the Gaddis case then referred to the following long line of Utah cases that have announced and
followed this rule:

Hall v. Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P. 1110;
Baker v. H.atch, 70 Utah 1, 257 P. 673;
Prows v. Hawley, 72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31;
Simper v. Brown, 74 Utah 178, 278 P. 529;
West v. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Utah 300, 17 P. 2d
292;
Pike v. Clark, 95 Utah 235,79 P. 2d 1010.
Respondent contends that there was an actual or
implied agreement between the parties as to the use of
the right of way by respondent as has been previously
argued. In addition to this, however, the respondent
submits that had the court considered and made a finding on the issues referred to above, it would have found
affirmatively in view of the evidence, or at least, such
findings would now be before this court for review. The
failure to make these findings, therefore, was prejudicial
to appellant's case and is reversible error.
POINT XI.
The Findings and Judgment are Contrary to the
Evidence.

The finding and judgment that there never was an
agreement between the parties creating an interest in ap53
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pellant in and to the right of way and that appellant has
no right, title or interest in it, is not supported by the
evidence.
Rule 52 (b) reads in part as follows :
"When findings of fact are made in actions
tried by the court without a jury, the question of
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the
party raising the question has made in the district
court an objection to such findings or has made
either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.''
Judgments resting upon findings contrary to or not
supported by the evidence may be set aside.
"It is well established that findings of fact
must conform to and he supported by the evidence, and that a judgment resting upon a finding
not so supported may be set aside upon motion
for new trial, or appeal." (53 Am. Jur., Trial, Sec.
1144, p. 798)
"The rule giving great weight in the appellate
court to the finding of the trial court on a question of fact lays no restraint on the power of the
former to ascertain, by full and careful investigation and analysis of the evidence, what the facts
and circumstances are and ·whether the general
finding is consistent therewith.... " (3 Am. Jur.,
463-2 Appeal & Error, Sec. 899 pp. 463-64)
There is uncontroverted evidence in the record that
at least for a few years (R. 99 , 167, 101, 193) there was
no dispute concerning the right of appellant to use the
joint right of way. In fact, the substantial evidence is
that it was many years before this right to use was put
in dispute in any way.
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It is an inescapable conclusion from the evidence
that the parties had some kind of an understanding giving appellant a permanent right to use the newly created
joint right of way. How else can the conduct of the appellant be ,explained in closing its only existing right
of way that it must have for its property and which it had
previously obligated itself to provide for those claiming
by, through, or under it, in tearing down valuable sheds
that were producing income in order to provide land
for the new right of way, and participating physicaily
in the making of the right of way.
The respondent does not deny this conduct on the
part of appellant and significantly does not attempt
to explain or give reason for it, but argues that such conduct on the part of appellant resulted in it ending up
with only a permissive use in the resulting new and only
existing right of way. The evidence will not support
this kind of conclusion.
There is substantial uncontroverted evidence to show
either an executed express oral agreement, or an implied
in fact agreen1ent, all of which have been previously discussed in detail.
The findings of the court that there was no agreement between the parties in the face of this kind of evidence is patently contrary to and not supported by the
evidence.
There is substantial uncontroverted evidence to support the creation of a right in the appellant to the use
of the right of way by estoppel. The evidence establishes
all of the required elements of a classic equitable estoppel
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or of a promissory estoppel, and it was contrary to the
evidence not to so find.
Finally, there is substantial uncontroverted evidence
that the parties intended to and did dedicate and abandon
the jointly created right of way to the use of the public
and the same has become a public way in accordance with
27-1-2 U.C.A., 1953, and the failure to so find was contrary to the evidence.
CONCLUSION

Although respondent initiated this suit more than
six years ago to recover rent for the use of a jointly created right of way, it did not Inove to advance it any time
during the pendency of this case. Respondent seemed
satisfied to have cast a cloud on appellant's right to the
use of the right of way. Appellant filed an answer and
counterclaim to determine and protect its right to the
use of the right of way.
Appellant contends and the evidence shows that appellant has a permanent right to the use of the right of
way by reason of any one or more of the the following:
An executed oral agreement, estoppel, implied agreement or because the right of way has become a public
way pursuant to 27-1-2 U.C.A. 1953.
Appellant further contends that it was error for the
court to set aside the default judgn1ent which affirmed
the right of appellant to use the right of way where the
motion to set aside was based upon "1nisake, inadvertence, surpris·e, or excusable neglect" and was filed more
than three months after entry of default.
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In reviewing this case this Court is justified in considering the manner in which it was filed by respondent;
its utter lack of interest in it; its failure to advance it for
more than six years, and finally the voluntary dismissal
of the complaint by respondent. Respondent first asserted a right to rent and then abandoned this for the
inconsistent position of permissive use. These raise serious questions concerning the reliability of all matters
asserted by respondent.
It is respectfully submitted that it would be a gross
miscarriage of justice if under the facts and circumstances here shown, the appellant were to lose its access
and right to the use of a right of way it jointly participated in creating.
It is respectfully requested that the judgment of the
trial court be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to enter judgment for appellant giving appellant and those claiming by, through, or under it the right
to use the right of way referred to herein in accordance
with the detailed provisions of the default judgment in
the record (R. 17) or a judgment that such right of way
is a public way.
Respectfully submitted,

OWEN & WARD
Cottnsel for Defendant and
Appellant

141 East Second South St.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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